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Abstract
Carbon offsets from the Kyoto Flexible Mechanisms can be used by firms in the EU Emis-
sions Trading Scheme for compliance in lieu of EU allowances, making these carbon assets in-
terchangeable. We offer an explanation of the price spread using a structural model of the price
for Certified Emissions Reductions that combines three features: A limit for the use of Kyoto
offsets within the EU ETS; a disconnect between the current price of offsets and their marginal
cost of production due to institutional reasons; and uncertainty about future supply and demand
of offsets. Our model expresses the offset price as an average of the EU allowance price and
an offset’s outside value, weighted by the probability of a binding import limit. Using monthly
series of the United Nation’s Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation about
offset supply and demand, we provide empirical support for our theory of offset price formation.
Counterfactual simulations suggest that the price process is dominated by uncertainty.
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1 Introduction
In order to reduce the European Union’s cost to comply with the Kyoto Protocol, the European Com-
mission allowed firms included in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) to cover
a part of their CO2 emissions using offsets from the Kyoto flexible mechanisms. This established a
link between the EU ETS and the Kyoto markets.1 The two types of emission certificates were in-
terchangeable assets in principle, because both provide the holder with the right to emit one ton of
CO2. Not surprisingly, the price for EU allowances (EUAs) on the one hand, and Certified Emission
Reductions (CERs) and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) on the other, have been highly correlated
during the Kyoto period and beyond. 2
However, the price for EUAs has consistently been higher than the price for CERs. Figure 1
shows the corresponding price histories.
Figure 1: Prices for EUAs, CERs (left axis) and their spread (right axis)
Source: Own illustration based on data from Thomson Reuters Datastream.
Some explanations for the price spread have been proposed in the literature: Some authors have
focused on transactions costs (Trotignon, 2012; Braun et al., 2015), whereas others argue that the
two carbon assets react differently to fundamentals such as fuel prices and economic activity (e.g.,
1This article contains a number of acronyms. To aid the reader, a table of relevant acronyms can be found in the
appendix.
2Because prices for CERs and ERUs are practically identical, but the liquidity of the former far exceeded that of the
latter before 2012, we use the CER price throughout the paper. In our empirical analysis, we focus on secondary CERs
throughout the paper, which do not contain delivery risk.
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Nazifi, 2013; Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2011). However, transactions costs would presumably drive
a (roughly) constant wedge between prices, and establishing a difference in the sensitivity to price
fundamentals neither explain the source of this difference nor why it persists. Furthermore, if the
markets were fully independent and each carbon asset driven by the (marginal) cost to generate it,
we would not expect the high degree of correlation that has been observed, given that abatement cost
curves are unlikely to be the same in Western Europe and in developing countries. Previous authors
have noted the importance of the import limit and of the expected demand and supply for offsets
for CER prices (see, e.g., Chevallier, 2011; Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2011; Nazifi, 2013). However,
these studies limit the analysis to standard time-series techniques and do not provide a structural or
economic explanation of the price spread.
In this paper, we explain the the EUA-CER price spread by proposing a specific economic mech-
anism that links these two prices, and which depends on the import limit and the expected future
supply and demand of offsets. The underlying assumption is that due to the lengthy and complicated
process underlying the generation and verification, the current expected supply of CERs is indepen-
dent of its current price. Our model is the first to (i) explicitly incorporate uncertainty about the net
position of the offset market into a CER pricing equation and (ii) include data about offset demand
and supply in our empirical analysis. We derive an pricing model that allows for a dynamic rela-
tionship between the two carbon assets, which changes as new information becomes available. We
propose uncertainty about future offset supply and demand, combined with a limitation of the num-
ber of offsets that could be used within the EU ETS, as the main price drivers for Kyoto offsets. Our
model explains a significant share of the observed price spread, and it is furthermore consistent with
the observation that the price for offsets gradually dropped to (near) zero by the end of 2012.
Without any restrictions, linking two emissions trading schemes leads to a single permit price,
equal to the cost of reducing emissions by one ton below the aggregate cap. But since the EU imposed
a limit of Kyoto offsets that could maximally be used in the EU ETS during Phase II, the prices for
EUAs and offsets need not converge.3 In general, a binding transfer limit breaks the link between
two emission permit markets. Once the allowable number of permits has been transferred from the
cheaper to the more expensive system, the situation is identical to one where two separate permit
3Throughout this paper, the term ”phase" refers to the different market phases of the EU ETS: Phase I (2005-2007),
Phase II (2008-2012), and Phase III (2012-2020). For a more extensive discussion of the design of the EU ETS, see
Hintermann and Gronwald (2015) and Ellerman et al. (2016). No explicit such phases exist in the market for CERs. A
review of the literature focusing on the drivers of EUA prices is given by Hintermann et al. (2016).
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markets coexist, but where some of the cap has been transferred from one market to the other.4
This reasoning abstracts from uncertainty. During much of Phase II, it was not clear whether the
import limit for offsets would turn out to be binding due to uncertainty on both the supply and the
demand side. Generating emission offsets either via the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or
by Joint Implementation (JI) is a complicated and lengthy procedure (Trotignon and Leguet, 2009).
Between the original proposal and the delivery of verified offsets, a project has to clear a number
of administrative stages, at each of which it may be rejected, delayed or its projected generation of
offsets adjusted. From market participants’ point of view, the total supply of offsets by a certain date
is therefore uncertain. The demand for offsets was uncertain as well, as it depended (besides demand
from ETS firms) on the extent to which Annex B countries of the Kyoto Protocol needed to rely on
offsets to achieve their emission reduction goals.5
We derive a model that expresses the offset price as an average of the EUA price and an offset’s
outside value, weighted by the probability that the import limit turns out to be binding. The iden-
tifying assumption of our model is that due to the lengthy process that underlies the generation of
Kyoto offsets, the current number of expected offsets is independent of the current offset price. We
calibrate the free model parameters using data about the expected supply and demand of offsets. The
calibrated model explains a significant share of the CER price variation. A supporting cointegration
and error correction analysis shows that the cointegration between EUA and CER prices broke down
at the same time as the probability of a binding import limit sharply increased. This suggests that our
model identifies the principal mechanism underlying the CER price formation.
2 Background
In the following, we present background information about the Kyoto flexible mechanisms and the
EU’s "Linking Directive" that established a link with the EU ETS, and present a short review of the
literature that is concerned with the market for Kyoto offsets.
4For a more detailed illustration of this point, see Grüll and Taschini (2012).
5Annex B countries agreed to binding emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. Countries’ emissions
during a calendar year are not made publicly available until the various sources have been checked and verified, which
often results in the publication of annual emissions not before the end of the following year. The deadline for purchasing
offsets was set by the end of the “true-up period”, which was on November 18, 2015; see the United Nations Framework
on Climate Change, “True-up period reporting and review process”, available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_Protocol/true-
up_process/items/9023.php, last accessed on January 15, 2016.
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2.1 The Kyoto flexible mechanisms
The Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms were designed to lower the cost of achieving the emissions
reductions agreed to by the countries listed in Annex B (i.e., the countries that agreed to binding
emissions reductions), by carrying out emissions-reducing projects more cost-effectively in other
countries. The Kyoto Protocol differentiates between two types of flexible mechanisms based on
where the emissions reductions take place. Projects in developing countries are governed by the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and produce one Certified Emissions Reduction (CER) per
avoided metric ton of CO2. Emissions reductions in other Annex B countries fall under the flexible
mechanism called Joint Implementation (JI), and result in the issuance of an Emissions Reduction
Unit (ERU) per metric ton of CO2. CERs and ERUs therefore only differ in terms of their origin, but
not in terms of their “content” or the way they can be used, and we therefore refer to both as "Kyoto
offsets" or simply offsets. The prices for CERs and ERUs were largely identical, although the market
for the former was much more liquid than that of the latter; a graph of the CER and ERU prices is
shown in Figure A1 in the appendix. The price convergence is consistent with our model where the
price for offsets is determined by their value of their use rather than their marginal cost of production
(see below), which likely differs between Annex B and developing countries.
CDM project activities have to comply with the requirements defined by the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2015a). They have to follow a seven-step
process, which is illustrated in Figure 2.
The first step consists in the project participants (i.e., the entity that proposes to carry out the
actual project) preparing a project design document (PDD) in accordance with guidelines laid out in
UNFCCC (2015b), and submitting it to the Designated National Authorities (DNA) of both countries
involved (i.e., the country of the project participant, and the country where the project is to be imple-
mented). The PDD describes the proposed project and lists the expected emissions reduction per year
of operation. The preparation of the PDD can be the most time-consuming step in the entire project
cycle (UNFCCC, 2013).
If satisfied, the DNAs write a letter of approval confirming that both parties are part of the Kyoto
Protocol, and that the project contributes to the host country’s sustainable development. Based on this
national approval, the project participants then contract an independent auditor, a so-called designated
5
Figure 2: CDM project cycle
Source: Own illustration based on Fig. 3.1 in UNFCCC (2013).
operational entity (DOE) for the validation of the project activity.6 The DOE verifies whether the
project proposal is consistent with the requirements of the CDM according to additionality and other
requirements defined in UNFCCC (2015b,c), and makes the PDD publicly available for a 30-day
consultation period. Based on the comments from the various stakeholders, the DOE either validates
(i.e., approves) or rejects the project. If the project has been validated, the DOE submits a request for
registration. After an additional check for completeness by the UNFCCC secretariat, the request is
made publicly available. If no review request is received within 28 days, the CDM EB registers the
proposed project; otherwise, and additional review takes place. All CDM projects must be registered
before they can be implemented.
After the implementation of the project, the project participants have to prepare a monitoring
report at regular intervals that demonstrates the emission reduction achieved, and submit it to a DOE
for verification.7 The DOE verifies whether the reported emission reduction took place, based on
the requirements for additionality defined in UNFCCC (2015c) and an on-site inspection. If the MR
has been verified, the DOE submits a request for issuance of CERs to the CDM EB. This request
is again made publicly available. If no review request is received from any party involved in the
project within 28 days, the CDM EB grants the issuance of CERs according to the number of verified
emission reductions. The last three steps are repeated for the duration of the project.
6Firms or organizations have to be registered by the UNFCCC in order to become DOEs. The Executive Board of the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM EB) maintains a public list of approved DOEs.
7The DOE contracted for the verification of the achieved emission reductions usually differs from the DOE contracted
for validation, but the same DOE can be contracted upon request.
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At each step of the CDM project cycle, a project may be rejected, or approved subject to additional
requirements, which may cause a significant delay (Trotignon and Leguet, 2009). Furthermore, the
number of CERs produced per year may be smaller or greater than the emissions reductions specified
in the original PDD. The United Nations Environment Programme maintains a database of all CDM
projects and tracks their progress that have been approved by the DNA; this monthly database is the
source for our offset supply data (see below).
The total time between the initial project idea and the eventual delivery of CERs depends on the
nature of the project and the involved countries. The average time lag between the comment period
(during validation) and the registration of a project is shown in Figure A2 in the appendix, and Figure
A3 presents the average time lag between the end of the monitoring period and the issuance of CERs.
Figure A4 shows the number of projects at different stages of the CDM cycle. The total time it takes
to “create” a CER is the sum of the time lags shown in these figures, plus the time it takes to create the
PDD (anywhere between 6 months and several years) and to obtain the letters of recommendation,
plus the monitoring period (usually a year), which can easily add up to 5 or more years in total. This
implies that the supply of CERs cannot increased in response to an increase in the CER price, at least
not in the short to medium run.
The procedures governing Joint Implementation are very similar to those for CDM, with the main
difference being that two Annex B countries are involved. More details about the JI are provided in
the appendix.
2.2 The "Linking Directive"
In the directive that set up the EU ETS, the European Commission allowed the included firms to
cover some of their emissions using Kyoto offsets (European Union, 2003). On average, the number
of Kyoto offsets that firms in the EU ETS were allowed to use was 13.5% of their free allocation,
which amounted to around of 1.4 billion during Phase II. However, the exact number of offsets that
could be used by firms varied by country, and sometimes even by industry. There were also differing
rules regarding the use of the import quotas: Whereas some countries allowed their firms to use their
quota at any time during Phase II of the EU ETS, which coincided with the period of the Kyoto
Protocol, others stipulated that unused limits in one year could not be transferred to another year.
Because of the time delays discussed above, few offsets were available in the beginning of the
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phase, and it was not clear how many offsets would be available by the end of 2012. To accommodate
these issues, the European Commission decided in April, 2009, that firms could transfer any unused
import limits to Phase III of the market (European Union, 2009). In addition, installations that for
some reason were not given an import limit of 13.5% of free allocation in Phase II, or that entered
the market only in Phase III, were given an additional import allowance for Phase III, which roughly
amounted to another 300 million offsets. The total number of offsets that EU ETS firms are allowed
to use in Phases II and III (i.e., between 2008 and 2020) is therefore around 1.7 billion.
While offsets generated during the Kyoto period can be banked for use after 2012, the reverse
is not true: Offsets generated after 2012 could not be used for compliance in Phase II.8 However,
because of the large amount of banked EUAs and the right to use up import limits through the end
of Phase III, this no-borrowing constraint was not binding. Offsets generated after 2013 could thus
be used by EU ETS firms during Phase III, but with some restrictions regarding the activities and
locations of projects. Specifically, activities involving fluoroform (HFC-23) and nitric acid were
excluded, and projects had to be located in a “least developed" country.
2.3 Related literature
Hieronymi and Schüller (2015) investigate how the existence of different emission permit classes
affects firms’ investment decisions between fossil and renewable sources of energy production. The
authors apply a real options approach and find that having the option to use offsets increases the
likelihood that a firm invest into a natural gas plant as opposed to wind energy, due to the lower
compliance costs, and this effect increases with the import limit for offsets. Effectively, the provision
to allow EU ETS firms to cover a part of their emission using Kyoto offsets amounts to a softening of
the EU’s climate policy. Vasa (2012) discusses policy changes that would lead to a different allocation
of the rents from the EUA-CER spread, such as auctioning of the rights to use offsets.
Rahman and Kirkman (2015) focus on the CDM as such and find that the costs associated with
generating CERs decrease with the scale of a project and its duration, vary across project types, and
increase over time. Trotignon (2012) provides an overview of the regulatory conditions and analyses
the use of offsets in the EU ETS in 2008 and 2009. He finds that some ETS firms used offsets during
the first two years of Phase II, but that many firms did not, despite the price difference. Among
8This could theoretically have been the case for offsets generated between January and April of 2013, as this is the
time when firms had to surrender allowances to cover their emissions for the year 2012.
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the offset importers, few exhausted their import limits. One possible explanation is the presence
of transaction costs. Similarly, Braun et al. (2015) propose a model where multiple compliance
targets co-exist, and show how differential transactions costs lead to a price spread between otherwise
identical emission allowances.
A number of papers have looked at the EUA-CER spread from a technical perspective. For exam-
ple, Nazifi (2013) employs a time-varying parameter model to relax the assumption of a fixed struc-
tural relationship between fundamentals and carbon assets. Among the main findings of that paper is
that EUA price drivers affect CER prices in a different way and, as a result, a price spread emerges.
Noteworthy is that this empirical analysis shows that institutional news and regulatory changes re-
garding the usability of CERs significantly affects the CER market; however the empirical model is
ad-hoc and not structural. Koop and Tole (2013) employ flexible multivariate time series models to
allow for time-varying parameters to study jointly model EUA and CER prices. They find evidence
for contemporaneous causality with a dominant role of EUA futures, and that the relationship be-
tween the two types of carbon prices is changing over time due to the influence of macroeconomic
factors such as the financial crisis. Qualitatively similar findings are obtained by Chevallier (2012),
who uses a regime-switching model to show that business cycles are an important driver of the dy-
namics of the relationship. Kanamura (2016) studies the influence of carbon swap trading and energy
prices on the relationship between EUA and CER prices. He shows that the correlation between EUA
and CER prices has different drivers in different periods: while EUA-CER swap transactions explain
a high correlation during periods with high EUA prices, falling energy prices explain the correlation
between the two price series in the period of the financial crisis.
Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2011) identify a cointegration relationship between EUA and CER
prices. Using a variance decomposition analysis, they report that a significant share of the varia-
tion of CER prices is explained by EUA price variations (but not vice versa), which is consistent with
the assumptions that underlie our own model.9 Similar to Nazifi (2013), information from the CDM
pipeline is used in order to explain a share of the variation of the price spread, but without a structural
derivation. To summarize, the papers discussed above capture the CER price process in a technical
way, using different data and econometric models. Our paper builds on this literature in the sense that
we recognize the presence of a systematic dynamic relationship between the EUA and CER prices,
in which the former takes a leading role.
9In contrast, Mizrach (2012) and Nazifi (2013) find no cointegration relationship between EUA and CER prices.
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3 Model
In the following, we present the models we use in this paper: first, the structural CER price model
and, second, the supporting cointegration and error correction analysis.
3.1 CER price model
We denote EUA prices by Pt and prices for offsets from the Kyoto flexible mechanisms (either CERs
or ERUs) by Ct. Global demand and supply of offsets at time t are given by dt and st, respectively.
We assume that the probability of noncompliance (i.e., that total emissions during Phase II exceed
the total cap plus the import limit) is negligible, which was arguably the case after the decrease in
business-as-usual emissions in the wake of the economic crisis of 2009. This means that a positive
amount of allowances is transferred from Phase II to Phase III in expectation, which in turn implies
that the allowance price in these two phases is continuous. This assumption is consistent with the
empirical price data shown in Figure 1.
We further define St0 ≡
∑t
k=0 sk to be the cumulative offset supply by time t, which is observable,
and STt ≡
∑T
k=t+1 sk to be the cumulative future offset supply until the terminal period for offset use,
T . Due to the stochasticity of offset supply, STt is uncertain at time t. Likewise, D
t
0 ≡
∑t
k=0 dk refers
to cumulative offset demand observed to date, and DTt ≡
∑t
k=0 dk to uncertain future demand.
An important assumption in our model is that the time delay between an initial project proposal
and the eventual delivery of certified offsets breaks the short-term link between the price and the
expected supply of offsets. For example, an increase in the offset price in 2010 may lead to more
projects being initiated, but we assume that this has no effect on the number of offsets that become
available by the end of 2012. Conversely, projects that have incurred most of the associated fixed
costs will continue to deliver offsets even if the offset price decreases, provided that the marginal
costs of offset production are sufficiently low.10 Because the UN pipeline data does not identify
projects that are placed on hold and thus keeps them as active projects, our measure of expected
supply does not incorporate price-induced reductions of the CER supply. This renders the expected
excess offset supply published by the UN exogenous, rather than jointly determined with the offset
10Many offset projects consist in installing new production technology, which implies a combination of high fixed costs
and low (or even negative) marginal abatement costs, compared to the situation without investment. In other words, once
a more efficient production technology has been installed, it will be used independently of the CER price. Naturally, this
assumption does not apply to CERs that are produced by means of fuel switching.
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price, such that it can be used as an explanatory variable. On the demand side, Annex B countries
typically make their purchases depending on the success of their domestic abatement efforts, which
we assume to be independent of the price of offsets.11
As long as offsets can be used in the EU ETS, the relevant opportunity cost is the price of an
EUA: Buying one offset allows firms to save one EUA to cover their emissions, which they can either
sell on the market or bank into future periods t > T . If the EU ETS import limit has been reached,
the opportunity cost for an offset depends on the willingness to pay by Annex B countries to reduce
their Kyoto compliance gap by one unit, which could in theory be different to the price for EUAs.
However, for lack of a different global reference price for CO2 emissions, and because countries
could also use EUAs in lieu of offsets to comply with their Kyoto obligations, we assume that the
willingness to pay for offsets both within and outside the EU ETS is given by the price for an EUA
as long as the total number of supplied offsets does not exceed global demand related to the Kyoto
process. If supply exceeds global demand (i.e., demand from the EU ETS plus Annex B countries),
the willingness to pay for offsets will be related to their use in the context of the Paris Agreement,
and possibly to private demand unrelated to any climate treaty.
Denoting the value for this "residual" use assigned to offsets at time t as Vt, we obtain the follow-
ing relationship between offsets and EUA prices in some terminal period T:
CT = PT if ST0 ≤ DT0 (1)
CT = VT if ST0 > D
T
0 (2)
At time t < T , firms are not sure whether offset supply will exceed global demand. The expected
payoff from holding an offset at time t, subject to the available information at this time, is
Et[CT ] =Et[PT ] · Pr(St0 + STt ≤ Dt0 +DTt ) + Et[VT ] · Pr(St0 + STt > Dt0 +DTt ) (3)
Let xt ≡ STt −DTt refer to the future cumulative excess supply of offsets between t and T , which
is a stochastic variable distributed according to the probability density function f(xt). This allows us
11At very high offset prices, countries might prefer to institute new climate policies. However, the time lag between
the proposition of new policy and results in terms of abatement may take years as well. In any case, the prices of offsets
were below expectations throughout the Kyoto Phase, and certainly well below abatement costs e.g. by fuel switching.
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to express (3) as
Et[CT ] = Et[PT ] ·
∫ Dt0−St0
−∞
f(xt)dxt + Et[VT ] ·
∫ ∞
Dt0−St0
f(xt)dxt (4)
Using the central limit theorem and defining the expectation and standard deviation of xt as µxt
and σxt , respectively, the variable Qt ≡ (xt − µxt )/σxt has a standard normal distribution such that we
can express (4) as
Et[CT ] = Et[PT ] ·
∫ (Dt0−St0−µxt )/σxt
−∞
φ(Qt)dQt + Et[VT ] ·
∫ ∞
(Dt0−St0−µxt )/σxt
φ(Qt)dQt ,
or, equivalently, as
Et[CT ] = Et[PT ] · Φ
(
Dt0 − St0 − µxt
σxt
)
+ Et[VT ]
(
1− Φ(·)) , (5)
where φ(·) and Φ(·) refer to the p.d.f and c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution, respectively, and
their argument is the standardized expected excess demand until period T .
Arbitrage implies that the prices of offsets and EUAs have to be equal to their discounted expected
prices in period T , where r is the risk-free rate of discount:12
Ct = Pt · Φ
(
Dt0 − St0 − µxt
σxt
)
+ e−r(T−t)Et[VT ] ·
(
1− Φ(·)) (6)
Eq. (6) is our offset pricing equation and states that the spot price of an offset is equal to the spot
price of an EUA,13 times the probability that the total supply of offsets is insufficient to cover the
global demand (the sum of EU ETS firms and Annex B countries). In that case, offsets and EUAs
are fungible assets and their prices converge. If, on the other hand, the market expects an oversupply
of Kyoto offsets, then offsets should trade at a significant discount relative to EUAs, assuming that
12Our focus is on pricing CERs based on their opportunity costs, and we abstract from the risk premia of EUAs and
CERs by assuming that investors are risk-neutral. Under risk neutrality, the stochastic discount factor, which is the basis
of pricing assets under risk, reduces to the rate of time preference. Using notation from Cochrane (2009), the price of
an asset is given by p = E[mx], where m is the stochastic discount factor and x the payoff. Under risk neutrality, the
marginal utility of income is the same across all states of the world, such that the pricing equation reduces to p = m·E[x].
In our context, the discount factor becomes m = e−r(T−t), which results in eq. (6).
13Note that the pricing equation holds for future prices as well, provided that the delivery period is no later than T .
Due to the import rules, CER futures with delivery beyond T would be priced according to only the second half of the
price equation, since use in the EU ETS or Kyoto is not an option.
12
Et[VT ] < Pt. If there is no use for Kyoto offsets outside Annex B countries, then VT = 0.
Our pricing equation (6) is qualitatively similar to pricing equations derived for EUAs during the
first phase of the EU ETS (Carmona et al., 2009; Chesney and Taschini, 2012; Hintermann, 2012).
These equations express the price for an EUA as a function of the penalty for noncompliance and
the probability that the first-phase cap turned out to be binding. A common feature of these price
equations is that they are based on models of discontinuous markets. In the first phase of the EU ETS,
the discontinuity was due to the no-banking provision, which made it impossible to bank unused
allowances into the second market phase. At the end of the first phase, allowances were therefore
either worth nothing or the penalty for noncompliance. In the present context, the discontinuity
stems from the fact that offsets cannot be used in the EU ETS beyond 2020. Any unused offsets are
then sold at the price of the outside option VT (which could be zero).
In our data, we do not observe Dt0 and D
T
t separately and thus cannot compute µ
x
t directly. How-
ever, the numerator in (6) is the total expected excess demand, which we can compute based on our
data as
Dt0 − St0 − µxt = Et
[
DT0 − ST0
]
(7)
There is no empirical information about what σxt should be. However, if only few offsets have
been issued, the uncertainty associated with delays and attrition is arguably greater than if a significant
share of the announced offsets already exists. As t→ T , the uncertainty vanishes, at least in theory.14
To account for this, we specify the uncertainty about future excess supply as a decreasing function of
the share of the total expected offsets that have actually been issued by time t, and include σ as a free
parameter in the model:
σxt = σ ·
St0 + E[S
T
t ]
St0
for St0 > 0 (8)
The parameter σ represents the standard deviation of the expected excess supply if all announced
offsets have been issued; the remaining uncertainty is therefore entirely due to the demand side.
Last, (6) depends on market participants’ expectation of the outside value of offsets, VT . We
14Note that this is true only if information about offset supply is instantaneously available. In reality and as discussed
above, monitoring takes place irregularly and with a delay, such that eve at t = T , the exact number of offsets available
is not known.
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leave this as a free parameter, but allow it to be updated after the Copenhagen negotiations about a
post-Kyoto agreement failed in December 2009.15 We thus include a dummy, Dcopt , that is equal to
zero before December 2009, and one thereafter. This leads us to the following specification:
Ct = Pt · Φ
(
Et
[
DT0 − ST0
]
σ · E[ST0 ]/St0
)
+ e−r(T−t) [V0 + Vcop ·Dcopt ] ·
(
1− Φ(·)) (9)
In our empirical section, we calibrate the free parameters σ, V0 and Vcop by estimating (9) by
nonlinear least squares.
3.2 Cointegration and error correction
To obtain a quasi-external validation of our pricing model, we employ a cointegration and error
correction analysis. This analysis does not rely on the two main assumptions made in the development
of our pricing equation: The expected supply of offsets does not respond to the current price for
offsets, and the EUA price drives the CER price but not vice versa. The idea of the theoretical model
we put forward is captured here in a different manner. If the probability that a CER can be substituted
for an EUA at the end of the relevant time period is high, the two price series would be closely related
and, thus, possibly cointegrated. In contrast, the smaller this probability is, the less related the prices
will be, which should result in a lack of cointegration. In case a cointegration relationship exists, the
estimation of an error correction model (ECM) is useful.
Rather than conducting this analysis using the entire sample, we investigate how this relationship
changes over time. To do this, we start with an initial subsample and subsequently add observations,
while holding the starting point of the sample fixed.16 For each subsample, we perform the standard
cointegration and error correction procedure described by Engle and Granger (1987). For this, we
regress the EUA price on the CER price and compute the residuals. This is commonly referred to as
estimating the long-run relationship; thus, the residual series measures the distance or the equilibrium
error between the two variables under consideration. If a cointegration relationship exists - or in other
words, an equilibrium relationship - the residual series will be stationary.
15During the Conference of Parties (COP) meeting in Copenhagen, it became clear that there would be no continuation
of the Kyoto Protocol in the sense that there was no binding multinational treaty that specified mandatory emissions
reductions. However, some countries (including all members of the EU) agreed to voluntary emissions reductions.
16This procedure is referred to as ”forward recursive" and is very common in the applied time series literature. Most
recently, Phillips and Yu (2011) employ this procedure in order to identify origin and collapse date of stock market
bubbles. This further development of so-called cointegration based tests for speculative bubbles also involves applications
of unit root tests.
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We then conduct a two-part analysis. First, we apply a Phillips-Perron unit root test of no cointe-
gration, against a null hypothesis of a stationary residuals (which implies the presence of cointegra-
tion). The forward-recursive application of this procedure yields a sequence of p-values, which can
then be used to illustrate a potential change in the cointegration relationship over time. Second, we
estimate an error correction model, which captures how the CER price responds to the equilibrium
error. If an equilibrium relationship exists between CER and EUA price, the coefficient of the equi-
librium error (which is also called the adjustment parameter) enters the error correction model in a
statistically significant manner. This procedure is applied forward recursively and allows us to track
the development of both the adjustment speed and the associated p-value over time. More technical
details about the cointegration and error correction analysis can be found in the appendix.
4 Data
We obtained a monthly series of the UN’s “CDM and JI pipeline”.17 The data contains information
about all projects that have reached at least the validation stage. For each project, the expected
number of offsets is computed by the end of 2012 and by the end of 2020. The data also contains
information about actual offset issuance, project type, location etc.
The expected number of offsets is based on the information contained in the project design doc-
ument (PDD). To correct for delays and to incorporate new information about the issuance success
(i.e., the productivity) of a project, we make the following corrections:
Credit start of projects that have not yet been registered
The PDD of each project contains an expected credit start, which is the expected time when a project
starts to actually reduce emissions and thus generates emission offsets. This credit date is only ad-
justed if a revised PDD is submitted, or if the project is registered. Due to delays in the CDM or JI
process (see above), the projected credit start is quite often before the current month of observation,
even though the project has not yet been registered (and thus the credit start cannot have happened).
Whenever this is the case, we replace the expected project date with the current date. For example,
suppose that the CDM pipeline of July 2011 lists an unregistered project with a projected credit start
17Available at www.cdmpipeline.org, last accessed in January 2016. The website only contains the current pipelines.
We thank the UN’s Jorgen Fenhann for providing us with the historic pipelines.
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in 2010. In this case, the expected project start is moved forward to July 2011.
Issuance success of registered projects
Once a project is registered, it begins to produce offsets. After each monitoring period, the number of
generated offsets during this period is listed in the (verified) monitoring report. This number may be
greater or smaller than the number expected based on the PDD due to unforeseen shocks or events;
however, the “expected offsets by 2012/2020” series in the CDM and JI pipelines do not account for
this new information, but continue to list the expected offsets based on the PDD. To correct for the
heterogeneity in issue success, we adjust the number of expected offsets using the information from
the monitoring report at time t¯ in the following way:
Corrected expected (exp.) issuance (iss.) by T =
(
Exp. iss. by T − Exp. iss. by t¯) · (Observed iss. by t¯
Exp. iss. by t¯
)
+ iss. by t¯ (10)
For example, suppose that a project started in 2009, and based on its PDD it is expected to deliver
250,000 offsets per year, or 1 million offsets by the end of 2012. However, the monitoring report
for the first year (t¯ = December 31, 2009) shows that instead of the projected 250,000, only 200,000
offsets were produced. The formula above then computes the corrected expected issuance using this
issuance success of 80%, which results in a corrected expected issuance of (750kt · 0.8 + 200 kt=)
800 kt by 2012. An equivalent correction applies to the number of expected offsets by 2020.
The original data in the CDM and JI pipelines refer to so-called “primary” offsets, which are
subject to the full delivery risk. Because the adjustment carried out in (10) removes an important part
of the delivery risk, the resulting data more closely describes actually expected offsets. This makes it
consistent with the empirical analysis, which is based on secondary CER prices, i.e, prices for CERs
that have already been issued and therefore contain no delivery risk.
Restrictions for Phase III
After the end of Phase II, offsets from projects involving the reduction of HFC-23 or nitric acid
were excluded for use in the EU ETS or the Kyoto market. This excluded a significant share of
16
the expected offsets by 2020, as shown in Figure A5 in the appendix. Furthermore, only projects in
“least developed countries” were allowed for continued use (European Union, 2009), which excluded
offsets from projects e.g. in China. Issuance of CERs or ERUs from projects that did not meet these
criteria was still possible, but only for the emissions reductions that took place before 2013. We
corrected the “expected by 2020” series for the Phase III-restrictions by excluding offsets that did not
meet the inclusion criteria.
We obtained estimates for offset demand from Bloomberg, which cites the World Bank as one of
the sources. Demand estimates are split up between demand from EU ETS firms, based on the offset
import rules and Annex B countries. The data furthermore differentiate between demand by 2012,
and demand by 2020. However, expectations for the latter were not updated every month, but only
when new information became available.
Figure 3: Supply of offsets
Source: Own illustration based on data from UN CDM/JI pipelines (see footnote 17).
Figure 3 presents the the original and the corrected estimates for offset supply (sum of CERs
and ERUs) by 2012 and by 2020 over time, along with the actual issuance. The drop in the supply
estimates by 2020 is predominantly due to the restrictions imposed for Phase III. Note that although
the difference between projected and actual offset supply decreases over time, the two lines do not
actually converge. This suggests that once the CER price dropped to very low levels, some projects
either halted operation or stopped engaging in (costly) monitoring reports, but without notifying the
CDM board that the project had been abandoned.18
18Although this means that the UN data overestimates the true expected offset supply, from an empirical perspective
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Figure 4 shows the expected demand for offsets. Whereas demand and supply were of simi-
lar magnitude if computed by 2012, the surge in supply by 2020 (accompanied by a much smaller
increase in demand) resulted in a significant expected excess supply.
Figure 4: Expected excess demand for offsets (demand minus supply)
Source: Own illustration based on World Bank data as reported by Bloomberg.
We use next-December futures for EUAs from the European Energy Exchange (EEX). For the
CER price, we use the one-year future from Nordpool until February 2008, and a broker price from
Reuters thereafter (the Nordpool price series ends at some point; at the switch, the two prices are
identical). We accessed these prices via Thomson Reuters Datastream.
Summary statistics of all variables are presented in Table 1. Because the offset supply data follows
a monthly frequency, we use monthly values for our analysis. The trading volumes (aggregated to the
month) imply that both assets were traded at a sufficiently high frequency to justify the international
arbitrage underlying eq. (6).19
it is preferable to not include a price-induced response in offset supply, as we assume that the supply of offsets drives
the price, but not vice versa. In this sense, the UN supply estimates can be viewed as a quasi-exogenous (i.e., price-
insensitive) instrument for true CER supply.
19The longest price series for CERs is supplied by Thomson Reuters, which includes OCT transactions. However, this
price series does not include trading volumes. To get information about the volume of trades, we use data from EEX and
Bluenext, which covers a shorter time period.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Exp. offset supply by 2012 103 Mt CO2 2'920 346 2'037 3'351
Exp. offset supply by 2020 103 Mt CO2 7'561 1'797 2'037 9'342
Verified offsets 103 Mt CO2 1'109 906 51 2'498
Exp. offset demand by 2012 103 Mt CO2 1'803 616 1'255 3'237
Exp. offset demand by 2020 59 Mt CO2 3'091 656 2'725 4'700
CER price 103 Euro/tCO2 7.57 6.70 0.14 21.05
CER volume 78 kt CO2 1'703 1'679 2 6'929
EUA price 103 Euro/tCO2 11.86 6.18 3.55 27.38
EUA volume 91 kt CO2 19'932 39'095 142 226'732
Sample period: June 2007 until December 2015. Sources: Offset supply from the UN’s JI and CDM
pipelines; offset demand from the Bloomberg; CER and EUA prices and volumes from Thomson Reuters
Datastream; volumes are sum of transactions at EEX and Bluenext.
5 Results
We start by presenting the calibration results and then engage in the computation of counterfactual
CER prices based on different assumptions about the distribution of demand and supply for offsets.
Finally, we compare our results with those of a cointegration analysis to provide some external sup-
port of our theory.
5.1 Calibration
The time period T marks the relevant time horizon for the demand and supply of offsets. As discussed
in section 2, the relevant time horizon is December 2012 in the beginning, but switches to December
2020 when the EU decided to allow for the transfer of any unused import limits to Phase III. Rather
than just using April 2009 as switching date, we “let the data speak” in order to learn about how
information is processed in this market. We thus estimate (9) for all switches in the relevant time
horizon’ between January 2008 and December 2012. The model fit as measured by the Bayesian
Information Criterion is highest if the relevant time horizon switched to 2020 horizon in December
of 2008, which is five months prior to the issuance of the Amended Linking Directive.20 The fact that
the revealed switch occurs before the publication of the Directive could be explained by the content
of the directive being discussed several months before it was finalized. In addition, there was a public
20Using Akaike’s Information Criterion and the average absolute error leads to the same switching month.
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controversy about the additionality regarding offsets from HFC-23 projects, which were banned by
the directive, and which likely increased its salience.
The first column in Table 2 shows the calibrated values based on switching the series in December
of 2008. The second column displays the results if the switching date is set for April 2009, the
publication date of the Amended Linking Directive. The results are qualitatively similar, indicating
that the are not overly sensitive to the exact switching month.
Table 2: Calibration results
Switch in Dec. 2008 Switch in Apr. 2009
V0 14.89 14.32
(1.30) (1.27)
Vcop -14.11 -13.55
(2.68) (2.70)
σ 2,616 2,629
(4,122) (4,168)
Note: Coefficient estimates based on nonlinear regression of specification (9) using Stata Version 15.
Standard errors given in parenthesis.
The fact that the value of the outside option decreases from around 14 Euros to a number that
is statistically not different from zero (i.e., the sum of the coefficietns on V0 and Vcop) suggests that
the failure of an agreement for a post-Kyoto treatment lead to a downward adjustment of the outside
value of offsets to zero. In the absence of a formalized mechanism that allows countries or firms to
engage in emissions reduction efforts abroad, offsets generated via the CDM and JI mechanisms can
only be used for compliance within the EU ETS or Annex B parties, and are worthless otherwise.
Figure 5 shows the predicted CER price, along with the EUA price, based on the calibrated pa-
rameter values. The base model (9) captures the main price movements. Allowing the outside value
of offsets to be updated annually by including yearly dummies in the term in brackets, rather than
only after the COP meeting in Copenhagen in December 2009, leads to a much better model fit, sug-
gesting that the pricing equation (9) does not capture the full price process. However, because we
are mainly interested in proposing a mechanism that underlies the CER price rather than producing
a price prediction per se (which could be accomplished by including he lagged CER price as an ex-
planatory variable for the current CER price, but at the cost of foregoing any attempt for an economic
explanation), we proceed the analysis with the predictions of the parsimonious base model.
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Figure 5: Prices and predictions
Source: EUA and CER prices from Thomson Reuters Datastream; predictions based on own calcu-
lations.
5.2 Counterfactual CER prices
Using our calibrated values, we can compute CER prices under counterfactual assumptions about
offset demand and supply. First, we examine the sensitivity of the resulting CER price with respect to
a change in the expected excess demand. For example, the EU could have chosen a different import
limit, or Annex B countries could have achieved different abatement amounts at home (which would
have directly affected their expected demand for offsets). For this “what if”-exercise, we hold the
EUA price constant. The left panel in Figure 6 shows the CER price prediction for counterfactual
scenarios where excess demand is larger or smaller by 4 Gt. The effect of this sizable change in
excess demand (recall that the actual import limit to the EU ETS is 1.7 Gt) on the CER price is rather
small. The reason is that in the beginning of Phase II, the most important determinant in the CER
pricing equation is the large uncertainty about future supply and demand of offsets, which is in the
denominator of Φ(·) in (9), and which dampens the effect of even substantial changes in expected
excess demand.21 However, the more information that is revealed, and as a consequence, the smaller
the uncertainty about future excess demand, the larger is the effect of a change in excess demand, as
can be seen in the figure.
The right panel in Figure 6 shows the sensitivity with respect to the standard deviation of excess
21Given the large standard deviation σt, Φ(·) ≈ 0.5 unless the shift in the expected excess demand becomes very large.
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Figure 6: Counterfactual predictions for different expected excess demand
Source: EUA price from TR Datastream; demand data from Bloomberg; predictions based on own
calculations.
offset demand. The effect of doubling or halving σt is relatively small, and even multiplying σt by
a factor of 10 does not significantly affect the CER price. However, if σt were smaller by a factor
of 10, CER price would have approached zero much sooner, namely after the COP meeting at the
end of 2009. This is the moment when it became clear that there would be no binding international
agreement after the Kyoto period, thus basically eliminating the value of offsets if they cannot be
used within the Kyoto framework (including the EU ETS). Our results imply that the CER price
did not immediately respond to this change in the future institutional background due to the large
uncertainty surrounding the demand and supply of offsets. This suggests a role for institutions that
increase the transparency on both the demand and the supply side for future offset programs or when
linking domestic cap-and-trade markets, e.g., in the context of the Paris agreement.
5.3 Cointegration and error correction results
Having presented the results of our theoretical model, we now turn to the results of the cointegration
and error correction analysis. In the context of model (6), a break in the cointegration relationship
between the two prices can be interpreted in the sense that the import limit is binding, and thus that
the probability of CERs and EUAs being fungible assets becomes small. This would imply that an
equilibrium relationship no longer exists, which would be accompanied by both a decrease in the
magnitude and the loss of significance of the adjustment speed coefficient. The left panel in Figure 7
shows this probability, Φ(·), along with the adjustment speed parameter. The probability Φ(·) drops
sharply towards the end 2012, which coincides with a similarly decline in the (absolute) value of the
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adjustment speed parameter, α. The right panel shows that the decline in Φ(·) also coincides with a
loss of significance of the adjustment speed paramerer as well as a loss of cointegration.22 The fact
that this cointegration and error correction analysis yields a qualitatively similar result in terms of
when the two prices diverged lends additional support for our model.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a theory of CER price formation. We derive a pricing equation that specifies
the CER price as a weighted average of the EUA price and the outside value of offsets, with the weight
given by the probability that the limit for using offsets in the EU ETS turns out to be binding. We
calibrate our model using monthly data about offset supply from the UN’s CDM/JI pipelines, which
is a rich data source that, to our knowledge, has not been used to investigate CER price determination
to date. Our base model, which only contains three calibrated parameters, explains a significant share
of the CER price variation. Our findings are further supported by a series of cointegration tests that
indicate that the moment when the cointegrating relationship between EUAs and CERs breaks down
coincides with a sharp increase in the probability that the offset import limit turns out to be binding.
The existing literature on the price spread either applies a-theoretical time series approaches only or
emphasises the role of transaction cost. Thus, the former does not provide a structural explanation
for the observed spread while the latter argument is not able to explain the time-varying nature of the
price spread.
Using our calibrated model, we engage in a “what if” exercise where we analyze the sensitivity
of the offset price to changes in the level of expected excess demand, and in the uncertainty sur-
rounding the supply and demand of offsets. For example, the EU could have chosen a different offset
usage limit for the EU ETS, or Annex B countries could have been asked to publish their projected
offset demand in the context of the Kyoto protocol more frequently. We find that even significant
changes in the level of expected demand and/or supply lead to only minor changes in the resulting
CER price. In contrast, (significantly) reducing the uncertainty surrounding demand and supply of
offsets increases the dependency of the CER price to variations in demand and supply, as well as to
22Note that each element in the sequences of p-values and adjustment speed parameter estimates represents the value
at the end of each subsample. The cointegration tests indicates that the cointegration collapses some time after the loss of
significance of the adjustment speed parameter. This result reflects that the cointegration test requires a certain number
of "non-cointegrated" observations before the null of no cointegration is no longer rejected.
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changes in international climate policy. In particular, if the uncertainty about excess supply had been
significantly smaller, the CER price would have dropped to zero immediately after the negotiations
for a post-Kyoto agreement collapsed in December of 2009.
Our results suggest that uncertainty plays an important role when linking two emission trading
systems, in particular if institutional and regulatory barriers disconnect prices and quantities. In
such a situation, market participants are unsure if the market will be long or short, unless there are
specifically designed mechanisms that reveal this type of information. Such mechanisms were absent
in the CER/ERU markets, and as a consequence, the price for offsets remained high even when (in
hindsight) it was clear that aggregate supply far exceeded demand. Thus, important policy lessons
emerge from this analysis.
Uncertainty about whether (and/or when) two cap-and-trade markets will be fully linked is a nat-
ural scenario in the future if political concerns exist about unlimited linking domestic markets in the
context of the Paris Agreement. Under full linking, the more stringent market “inherits” the climate
policy of the less stringent market and may furthermore import price volatility due to regulatory
changes abroad (Green, 2017). At the same time, very limited linking may not be interesting from
an economic perspective since the expected costs savings would be minor. As a consequence, an
intermediate level of linking as analyzed in this paper may be a likely outcome, such that linking
under uncertainty may become the rule rather than the exception in future climate policy.
Our model could be applied to different contexts where assets are fungible in principle, but subject
to constraints which may or may not turn out to be binding. Examples include markets for electricity
futures where spot prices converge if and only if connection constraints are nonbinding, or the con-
vergence of prices for natural gas futures in North America and the rest of the world depending on
the capacity of gas export terminals.
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A Additional tables and figures
Table A1: List of acronyms
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CDM EB Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism
CER Certified emissions reduction
DOE Designated operational entity
DNA Designated national authorities
ERU Emissions reduction unit
EU European Union
EUA EU allowance
EU ETS EU Emissions Trading Scheme
HFC-23 Fluoroform
JI Joint Implementation
MR Monitoring report
PDD Project Design Document
UN United Nations
UNFCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
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B Emissions reductions via the Joint Implementation (JI) mech-
anism
The guidelines for participation in the JI mechanism are described in UNFCCC (2006). Parties may
apply to one of two different JI “tracks”. The first track consists in a simplified procedure that allows
the host party itself to verify that emissions reductions of a project are indeed “additional to any that
would otherwise occur” and issue the correspondent amounts of ERUs. Under track 2, verification
and issuance of ERUs has to follow the verification procedure under the JI supervisory Committee.
As in the CDM, the first step consists in project participants developing a project design document
(PDD), which contains all the information specified in the JI guidelines. The PDD must show that
the project has been approved by all the involved Parties, how the emission reductions are to be
achieved, and that its baseline and monitoring plan is in line with the required criteria specified in JI
guidelines. The PDD has to be submitted to an accredited independent entity (AIE), who makes the
PDD publicly available for a 30-consultation period involving all relevant stakeholders. The AIE then
determines whether the PDD provides all necessary information and makes its determination publicly
available. If no review on the part of a Party involved in the project or the JISC is requested within 45
days, the PDD is “determined” to be final, which means that the project can be implemented. After
implementation has started, project participants periodically have to submit a monitoring report about
the achieved emissions reductions to an AIE (which is typically different to the AIE involved in the
review of the PDD). The monitoring report is made publicly available, and the AIE has to verify the
emission reductions. This verification report then is again made publicly available and declared final
after 15 days, provided that no review on the part of a Party involved in the project or the JISC is
requested. The last step consists in the issuance of Emissions Reduction Units (ERUs) according to
the number of verified tons of CO2 during the monitoring period.
C Cointegration and error correction anaylsis
This section provides some technical details for the cointegration and error correction analysis. As
explained in a non-technical way in Section 3.2, initially a long-run relationship is estimated. Thus,
we estimate the following model using OLS:
29
Ct = β + γPt + ut (A1)
The estimated residuals uˆt are used in the subsequent steps. A Phillips-Perron unit root test is
used in order to test for a unit root in the estimated residuals. This procedure is commonly referred
to as Engle-Granger single equation cointegration test. The error correction model we estimate is
specified as follows:
∆Ct = c∆Pt + αuˆt−1 + et (A2)
Please note that data properties require modeling et as a GARCH(1,1)-process. This cointegration
and error correction analysis is conducted using daily data; the price series are in logs. The sample
period is Spring 2009 - Spring 2017. The sequences of adjustment speed parameters and p-values are
then aggregated to the monthly frequency used in the remainder of the paper.
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Figure 7: Probability of nonbinding import limit and cointegration
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Figure A1: Prices for CERs and ERUs
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Figure A2: Average delay between start of comment period and registration, by month of registration
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Figure A3: Average delay between MR and issuance, by month of issuance
 
Source: CDM pipeline from December 2015, Graph 4.
Figure A4: Cumulative number of projects at different stages of the CDM cycle
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Source: United Nations, CDM pipeline from December 2015.
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Figure A5: Expected CERs by project type
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